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Language Policy, Innovations and Practices: A Tale of Two Countries
The Expected and Unexpected Failures
of the Global 30 Program
Michael HOLLENBACK
1. Introduction
The Global 30 (G30) program, lasting from 2009 to 2014, was tasked with aiding 
in increasing the number of international students in Japan to 300,000, almost 
tripling the number, and to help promote the overall internationalization of higher 
education (MEXT, 2009). However, upon its conception, continuing through its 
implementation, and eventually to its premature cancellation, the G30 program 
proved to be more a failure than a success. Furthermore, these failures reflected not 
only the inability of the program to reach its intended targets, but also a larger 
failure of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT) to internationalize the selected universities in terms of their 
organization or outlook. 
Through the G30 program, MEXT utilized an interpretation of internationalization, 
which focused on Japanese economic and cultural power in the globalized 
neoliberal marketplace, while leaving many international students at the mercy of 
overly bureaucratized higher education institutions which were not equipped to 
adequately serve their needs or interests. In this interpretation, internationalization 
has little to do with aligning higher education institutions along international 
frameworks or norms, and does not seek to have individuals within the university 
attain a more international outlook or identity. These failures, unfortunately, 
illuminate the ambivalent position of the Japanese government towards language 
and education policy, especially as it concerns the wider societal use of the English 
language and the international ‘other’ as a group or individual in Japan. To 
understand the reasons for the failures of the G30 program, the intentions behind its 
inception and the methods of its execution must be explored and evaluated, and 
underlying questions about its explicit and implicit goals must be asked.
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2. The Global 30 Program
2.1 Background of the program
With a birthrate among the lowest in the world, Japan’s population first started to 
shrink in 2010 with the population of graduating secondary students eligible to 
continue onto higher education falling from 1.81 million in 1992 to just 1.09 
million in 2008 (JASSO, 2009). During this same period, the number of higher 
education institutions in Japan rose to over 1,000 with an overall acceptance rate of 
92.5% for those students who wished to enter tertiary education and an 
advancement rate of 77.6% of all graduating secondary students moving into 
different types of higher education (JASSO, 2009). This near parity of potential 
students to admitted students created a situation in which some smaller and 
medium-sized higher education institutions must rigorously compete for potential 
students in order to stay financially solvent. This overly accommodating admission 
process results in falling academic rigor and an overall dampening of Japan’s 
academic prestige. One of the ways Japanese higher education and many 
universities are trying to fill their cohorts is by shifting towards increasing the 
numbers of international students (Walker, 2005). The ability of Japan to project 
itself as a hub of international education and research is essential to continue the 
trend of increasing the numbers of international students.
After a post-war economic boom, Japan became the dominant economic power in 
Asia and eventually the second largest economy in the world. Combined with the 
existing structure of former imperial national universities and successful private 
universities, Japan hosted some of the finest higher education institutions in the 
hemisphere. As the economies of East Asia developed, many of the elite sent their 
children to study in Japan, ostensibly to gain knowledge of Japanese business and 
technology, and bring that expertise back to their home countries. As student 
mobility increased even further with the rise of a wider Asian middle class in the 
early 2000s, Japan saw an influx of international students, reaching 100,000 in 
2003 (JASSO, 2009). However, at the same time, these economically developing 
countries were also advancing their own education systems, and Japan began to 
lose its appeal as an education destination. 
While this was happening, several companies, such as Times Higher Education, 
published rankings of the worlds’ top universities according to their overall 
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reputation, research record, and level of international integration. While of 
questionable methodological rigor and applicability, these rankings impact the 
global impression of Japanese higher education. This is reflected by the fact that in 
2013, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared the goal of elevating 10 Japanese 
institutions into the global top 100 by 2023 (Sawa, 2019).
As the Japanese higher education market grows more perilous and Japanese 
universities’ international status has declined, the market for international students 
worldwide has grown immensely with some estimating the market to reach over 
$100 billion worldwide (Ruby, 2009). Schools from around the world are 
competing for a share of these international students, with institutions in English-
speaking countries ranking among the most desirable destinations. English is the 
predominant lingua franca in academics, and the ability to provide courses and 
degrees in English is an important part of Japan being able to attract international 
students (Brown, 2018). 
With these three predominant factors in the background, the G30 program was 
primarily concerned with increasing the numbers of research-oriented international 
students who could study at prestigious Japanese institutions in English. This 
would have the desired effect of improving the international rankings of these 
universities and raising the international profile of Japanese higher education, 
which could result in an overall increase of international students to all universities 
in the country. However, it can be seen from the goals of G30 that higher education 
internationalization was not conceptualized as shifting educational structures along 
international norms, or incorporating more international parties into the Japanese 
higher education system.
2.2 The Structure of the program
The G30 program, with the official Japanese name translating to ‘Establishment of 
Hub for Internationalization’ was first announced in 2009. MEXT would initially 
choose 13 universities that would receive special funding amounting to 200-400 
million yen a year for five years, with the total amount reaching 15 billion yen 
(MEXT, 2009). Furthermore, an additional 17 universities would be chosen later 
with additional funding allotted to them. This is no small amount and would 
therefore result in fierce competition, as Japan consistently ranks near the bottom 
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among OECD nations in the amount of public spending on higher education 
(OECD, 2019). While there were behind-closed-doors discussions of the G30 
program for many months, the formal announcement for the program with a call 
for applications was made in mid-April 2009 with a deadline set in mid-May and 
the announcement of the first 13 successful universities on July 3rd, 2009 
(Ishikawa, 2011). This means that the entire process, including briefings to 
universities by MEXT, completion of applications, screening interviews and final 
selection by the committee took only two and a half months. 
Among these first 13 institutions, 7 public (Kyoto University, Kyushu University, 
Nagoya University, Osaka University, Tohoku University, University of Tokyo, 
Tsukuba University) and 6 private universities (Doshisha University, Keio 
University, Meiji University, Ritsumeikan University, Sophia University, and 
Waseda University) were selected. All of these institutions were already among the 
most reputable and exclusive in Japan and are destinations of many of the brightest 
students in the country. 
One of the notable areas that could have influenced the way in which schools were 
chosen for participation in G30 is that many of the policy-makers inside MEXT 
have traditionally been graduates of these elite universities (Ishikawa, 2011). In 
addition to the speedy selection process, the criteria that were used for selection 
raises questions as to the goals of the G30 program as decided by MEXT. Before 
taking a critical look at these criteria, it is important to note that information about 
how many and which schools applied for G30 as well as data about universities 
that did not apply or were not selected is largely unavailable. Therefore, we can 
only look at the selected institutions and evaluate them against a set of imagined 
standards about the intended goals of the G30 program and its focus on a particular 
type of internationalization.
One criterion for being selected was for an applicant university to have over 300 
current international students from at least four different countries, meaning 
successful applicant universities must already have had some kind of logistical 
structure to handle an influx of new international students (Ishikawa, 2011). 
However, many schools that had the largest international student populations at the 
time of application were not selected for the initial group of 13 universities. 
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According to the Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), which collects and 
publishes data on the numbers of international students in Japan, during 2009, the 
year in which the selections for the G30 program were made, among the top 10 
universities with the largest international student bodies, 8 were selected for G30 
(JASSO, 2009). 
However, some schools with relatively small international student bodies (Keio 
University: rank #16, Meiji University: rank #23, Sophia University: rank #28, and 
Doshisha University: unranked) were also chosen as one of the initial 13 schools 
(JASSO, 2009). This shows some level of disconnect between the universities, 
which already were able to attract large numbers of international students and the 
ones that MEXT wanted to promote as hubs of internationalization. Another 
relevant factor is to compare the international student populations to the total 
student body. While many of the G30 universities boasted larger numbers of 
international students, no school selected for G30 had more than 10% international 
students among their total student body (Ishikawa, 2011). From this first criteria, it 
can be seen that the goal of the G30 program was not intended to improve the 
experiences of international students already in Japan, or to expand the ability of 
the universities with the largest international student bodies to provide quality 
education for both domestic and international students or to better integrate these 
two groups. Rather, it was intended to focus on several large prestigious 
universities with relatively large international student populations and make these 
institutions more attractive.
Another criteria for selection stipulated that universities must have issued more 
than 340 post-graduate degrees in the previous three years and have been selected 
to receive more than 130 grants-in-aid from the government-funded Japan Society 
for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) (Ishikawa, 2011). This shows that MEXT 
preferred universities producing large numbers of graduate students, meaning those 
with the strongest research activities. However, the overwhelming focus on 
graduate students contradicts the typical profile of the majority of international 
students in Japan. JASSO (2009) reported that of the roughly 132,000 international 
students in Japan at the start of the G30 program, only 35,000 of them were 
graduate students. This again shows the disconnect between MEXT’s desire to 
promote research and publications in English, with the reality of having the vast 
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majority of international students come from outside graduate-level programs.
The criteria for acceptance into the G30 program displayed that MEXT intended 
the program for large, research-oriented institutions that had large student bodies. 
While some international students fit this profile, the majority of international 
students when G30 was conceived were at smaller, more broad-based universities 
with smaller graduate programs. While the conditions of international students and 
the criteria for G30 seem to be at odds, if we view the intended goals not to bring 
institutions in line with international norms or to improve the educational 
conditions of international students, but rather to improve the global rankings of the 
selected universities, things align much more cleanly. 
The most popular global rankings, published by Times Higher Education (THE), 
use several metrics to evaluate each university. Following the first criteria for 
selection into G30, the proportion of international students and faculty are one 
important metric for the rankings, with higher percentages meaning better scores 
(THE, 2018). 
As the G30 program is seen as intended to increase overall international student 
numbers, this would immediately positively impact the ranking of each university. 
Another metric for the global rankings involves the amount of relevant research 
that is published by students and faculty in the university, which is usually 
measured by number of citations, typically in English language publications (THE, 
2018). Having G30 universities focus predominantly on English-language graduate 
programs would also result in a larger amount of English-language research being 
published, which would again directly impact a university’s ranking. In addition, as 
the other major factor in these global ranking system is a survey on the reputation 
of the school and its graduates (THE, 2018). 
The idea that MEXT wished to use the G30 program to improve the global 
rankings of already prestigious universities in Japan is clear. Therefore, it can be 
seen that MEXT chose criteria for inclusion into G30 that would directly increase 
the global ranking of the selected universities by choosing the most prestigious and 
well-established universities in the country, and boosting their international student 
numbers and amount of published English-language research. This cynical 
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approach to internationalization means that the majority of international students 
already in Japan, or likely to come to Japan under existing systems would receive 
little to no benefit from the G30 program, and shows that there was no substantial 
emphasis on restructuring these institutions along more international lines.
2.3 Implementation of the program
After being selected, the action plan and subsequent goals for the 13 universities in 
the G30 program included 4 major points. The first action area involved setting up 
English-taught degree programs (ETP) in English. The 13 selected universities 
collectively pledged to establish 33 undergraduate and 124 graduate programs that 
would be ETPs, which would allow international students without Japanese ability 
to study (MEXT, 2009). As well, the selected schools collectively set a goal of 
increasing their international student body from a total of 16,000 in 2008 to over 
50,000 in 5 years (Ishikawa, 2011). This shows that while the overall goal of the 
Japanese government was 300,000 students by 2020, the G30 program was 
intended to be an isolated endeavor, with little applicability for other universities to 
follow. Being able to study in English is an important factor for students who 
eventually participated in the G30 program (Aleles, 2015). 
However, Japan had already amassed a body of over 100,000 international students 
by the start of the G30 program, with these students enrolling in programs that 
were mostly in the Japanese-language. The vast majority of these students came 
from East Asia, with 95% coming from the six countries of China, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand (JASSO, 2009). With the exception of 
Malaysia, these countries are not well known for producing a large number of 
English-language researchers that would enroll in graduate programs. Therefore, it 
can be seen that MEXT and the G30 program focused on countries that did not 
traditionally send large numbers of international students to Japan. 
As well, the ability of Japanese students to participate in these new ETPs was not 
guaranteed by the MEXT guidelines in the G30 program. 6 of the 7 national 
universities chosen limited enrollment in their ETP to students who were not 
citizens or permanent residents of Japan while none of the six private universities 
had the same restriction (Yonezawa, 2010). This amount of variety is largely due to 
the universities being left to interpret the procedure needed to meet the G30 goals 
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in their own ways, with each university creating their own process. The resulting 
academic segregation of student groups displays that internationalization efforts 
that would increase contact between Japanese and international students was not a 
major concern for MEXT. 
Furthermore, the quality of the established ETPs suffered from wide variety 
between each participating institution (Chapple, 2014). Some programs would be 
taught by current professors, simply translating their materials and tests into 
English and then conducting lectures in English. This system was sometimes 
enacted without a thorough check of the professors’ English ability, and without the 
professors’ agreement to teach English language courses (Heigham, 2014). In some 
G30 universities, additional international faculty were hired to teach classes in the 
ETPs, but while these new international faculty may or may not be more qualified 
to lecture in English as a matter of linguistic ability, their ability to teach the subject 
the course or program can be questioned if they were hired without the requisite 
academic background. 
Moreover, while some schools created English versions of existing programs, 
others created entirely new programs of cobbled together courses, which created a 
kind of disassociated program cohesion (Yonezawa, 2011). A lack of guidelines 
from MEXT and no mandated ETP assessment meant that G30 students might have 
received an education not at the same quality as Japanese students in the same 
institution.
Another action plan of the G30 program focused on improving the overall support 
system and services for international students in admissions, daily life, language 
education, and future employment (MEXT, 2009). This type of institutional support 
for international students is absolutely necessary and was rightly included by 
MEXT as one of the major areas of improvement for participating universities. 
Bradford (2016) discusses the linguistic, cultural, administrative and managerial, 
and institutional challenges that arise from the implementation of ETP for students, 
instructors, and administrative staff at universities. 
However, MEXT provided no further instructions about how this support system 
should be structured or integrated into the existing systems for student services. At 
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some institutions, entirely separate offices were established to handle international 
student services with extreme cases involving international students using an 
entirely different set of facilities and services (Hashimoto, 2013a). One example of 
this separation of services involves student housing. In 2014, the year the G30 
program was cancelled, over 25,000 international students lived in special housing 
intended for international students, with only roughly 6,000 international students 
living in general student housing (JASSO, 2014). 
While some institutions allowed Japanese and international students to share 
housing designated as international or general, the open-ended G30 guidelines 
made it possible for institutions to completely separate their international and 
domestic student bodies if they desired. It is clear that if a students’ nationality 
creates a separate program and support services, a university can not be thought of 
as internationalized in terms of their ability to integrate international peoples and 
norms into higher education (Hashimoto, 2013a). While another G30 project action 
item was the inclusion of high-quality instruction of Japanese language and culture, 
this was included initially as a support service for international students, and was 
never considered as an academic endeavor for students participating in newly 
established ETP under G30 (Ishikawa, 2011).
The fourth, and final, action plan was to set up overseas recruitment offices to be 
shared by universities both within G30 and outside the program (MEXT, 2009). Of 
the 13 selected universities for the G30 program, 8 were chosen to receive 
additional funding to set up these offices. However, the selection of locations for 
these offices raises questions in how these universities sought to attract students 
that could conduct research in English, or increase their general international 
student body from regions that did not historically send large numbers of 
international students. 
Kyushu University set up an office in Cairo, Egypt, Waseda University in Bonn, 
Germany, Tohoku University in Moscow and Novosibirsk, Russia, Ritsumeikan 
University in New Delhi, India, Tokyo University in Hyderabad, India, Nagoya 
University in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and Kyoto University in Hanoi, Vietnam 
(MEXT, 2009). Vietnam is the only country ranked among the top 5 countries that 
sent international students to Japan in 2009, with 3,199 students (JASSO, 2009). In 
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that same year, India, Germany, Egypt, Russia, and Uzbekistan collectively sent 
1,849 international students to Japan (JASSO, 2009). 
This collective number would have ranked at just #9, behind China, Korea, Taiwan, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, the United States, and Indonesia. Therefore, there 
doesn’t seem to be a clear reason why these locations were selected to help attract 
international students to Japan. Many of those countries are not famous for 
producing large numbers of English-language research students, nor did they have 
a track record of sending many international students to Japan. Again, without 
intervention by MEXT to guide G30 universities in choosing locations that would 
better represent the current international student body, participating institutions 
selected locations for their recruitment offices based on their own interests and 
desires, which are often at odds.
An exploration of the structure of the G30 program showed that MEXT valued 
improving the global rankings of prestigious universities in Japan by focusing on 
the metrics used to rank these institutions over providing better services to 
international students or to better integrate international and domestic student 
bodies. In the same way, the implementation of the G30 program displays that 
participating universities routinely isolated G30 students through the creation of 
separate ETP academic programs and international student services. 
Furthermore, the ability of universities to recruit students into these programs was 
entirely left up to university specific agendas, instead of any centralized effort from 
MEXT. The myriad ways in which the G30 universities interpreted the means to 
achieve the goals of the G30 program exhibits a lack of planning from MEXT, 
which resulted in varying quality of programs and services between universities. 
Hashimoto (2013a) comments that the implicit attitudes of MEXT was that the G30 
program was always intended to exist as a separate entity from the wider university 
as a whole, despite claims of broad-based internationalization.
3. Outcomes of the Global 30 Program
After the financial crisis of 2008, the Japanese government cut higher education 
funding by 100 billion yen in 2011, and by another 300 billion over the next three 
years (Ishikawa, 2011). This started the beginning of the end of the G30 program. 
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Though the initial 13 schools continued to receive funding, the additional 17 
schools were never chosen and the program was completely ended in 2014. While 
the G30 program met a premature end, we can look at the outcomes of G30 to 
further investigate whether it failed in its stated goals, as we have already 
established the failure of MEXT and the G30 universities to promote 
internationalization as the cooperation between domestic and international parties 
in higher education. The predominant goal of the G30 project was to increase the 
international student population, so the first outcome to explore is to look at 
international student bodies for each G30 University. 
Table 1 shows data from 2009 and 2014 (Ishikawa, 2011, JASSO, 2009, 2014). It is 
important to note that these numbers reflect the total numbers of international 
students in each institution, and do not isolate the numbers of students in either 
Japanese language programs or ETPs that were created under the G30 program nor 
between undergraduate and graduate programs in each university. Therefore, these 
trends must be looked at more generally to investigate how the G30 program 
impacted international student populations.
While it can be seen that every university that participated in G30 increased their 
international student body population, the amount of relative increase in almost 
every institution is rather small. While the G30 program existed for only 5 years, 
with the final target to be met in 2020, one would hope that each university would 
be roughly 50% of the way towards their goal by 2014. However, there is no 
university that is more than 35% of the way to their target international student 
population, with 6 of the 13 schools at less than 15% of the way towards their goal. 
If we accept the numbers that were decided by each institution to be appropriate, 
the G30 program can only be seen as a failure to meet these target international 
student numbers. 
Another area that can be examined are which countries sent the most international 
students to Japan, and how this changed after the end of the G30 program. With the 
increase in ETP programs in the G30 universities, and the establishment of 
recruitment centers in Egypt, Germany, India, Russia, and Uzbekistan, an increase 
in the number of students from countries that have strong English language 
education and/or a recruitment center would be expected. Table 2 displays the 
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countries sending the most international students to Japan in 2009 and 2014 
(JASSO 2009, 2014). Again, these numbers reflect the total numbers of 
international students, in both Japanese language and newly established ETP 
programs, as well as more broadly in graduate and undergraduate programs, as well 
as junior college and technical universities.
Table 1. Comparative International Student Body in Japan































3114 8000 4886 4306 1192 24.39%
University 
of Tokyo
2473 3500 1027 2798 325 31.64%
Tsukuba 
University
1522 4500 2978 1889 367 12.32%
Osaka 
University
1509 3000 1491 2012 503 33.73%
Kyushu 
University
1509 3900 2391 1972 463 19.36%
Kyoto 
University
1407 3200 1793 1725 318 17.73%
Tohoku 
University
1344 3211 1867 1532 188 10.06%
Nagoya 
University
1344 3000 1656 1668 324 19.56%
Ritsumeikan 
University
1230 4005 2775 1440 210 7.56%
Keio 
University
1053 4000 2947 1303 250 8.48%
Meiji 
University
786 4000 3214 1095 309 9.61%
Sophia 
University
675 2600 1925 914 239 12.41%
Doshisha 
University
343 3500 3157 1273 930 29.45%
 
In Table 2 it can be seen that many countries boasting the largest numbers of 
international students, and those with the largest increases between 2009 and 2014 
again do not fit into the areas focused on by the G30 program. As well, of those 
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countries specifically targeted by the G30 program, with the establishment of 
recruitment centers, the increases have a wide variation. Russia, Uzbekistan and 
Germany show increases well above the total average, while India is slightly below 
the overall average. Egypt shows an overall decline in international student 
numbers, probably owing to the political situation in the country after the Arab 
Spring revolution in 2011. 
Table 2. International Students to Japan by Country
Country Number of Int’l Students 
in Japan - 2009 (A)
Number of Int’l Students 
in Japan - 2014 (B)
Percentage 
Change (B/A)
Japan Total 132,720 184,155 38.75%
China 79,082 (#1) 94,399 (#1) 19.36%
South Korea 19,605 (#2) 15,777 (#3) -19.52%
Taiwan 5,332 (#3) 6.231 (#5) 16.86%
Vietnam 3,199 (#4) 26,439 (#2) 826.47%
Malaysia 2,395 (#5) 2,475 (#8) 3.34%
Thailand 2,360 (#6) 3,250 (#6) 37.71%
United States 2,230 (#7) 2,152 (#9) -3.49%
Indonesia 1,996 (#8) 3,188 (#7) 59.71%
Nepal 1,628 (#10) 10,448 (#4) 641.76%
France 624 (#14) 957 (#13) 53.36%
India 543 (#15) 727 (#16) 33.88%
Philippines 528 (#16) 753 (#15) 42.61%
Germany 450 (#17) 713 (#17) 58.44%
England 427 (#18) 502 (#21) 17.56%
Canada 345 (#19) 340 (#27) -1.44%
Australia 331 (#21) 345 (#26) 4.22%
Egypt 329 (#22) 268 (#30) -18.54%
Russia 304 (#23) 589 (#19) 93.75%
Uzbekistan 223 (#27) 358 (#25) 60.53%
As well, English speaking countries (United States, England, Australia, Canada) 
and former Anglosphere colonies (Philippines, Malaysia) showed wide varieties in 
the changing numbers of international students coming to Japan.
However, the two countries that saw the most dramatic increases were Vietnam and 
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Nepal, which suddenly became two of the biggest sources of international students. 
In addition, when comparing official numbers in 2009 and 2014, JASSO changed 
the way in which they counted international students. While in 2009 the numbers 
included students enrolled in undergraduate, graduate, technical and junior college 
programs, in 2014, JASSO also added groups of students who enrolled into 
Japanese language study programs (JASSO, 2009, 2014). Many of these students 
might be enrolled in these programs for only a few months, while others might 
study for more than a year in hopes of using their acquired Japanese language 
ability to gain admission into a Japanese language undergraduate or graduate 
program. 
So again, while the overall numbers of international students increased, there is 
little evidence that G30 significantly impacted on the numbers of students coming 
to Japan in general, and the inclusion of a previously ignored student body might 
have had more to do with numerical increases than any educational or language 
policy that was enacted by MEXT.
Another area to investigate is the effect that the G30 program had on the 
international rankings of the participant universities. Table 3 shows a selection of 
rankings of G30 universities and some composite scores in 2009 and in 2014 
published by Times Higher Education (THE, 2009, 2014). Universities without 
rankings (Ritsumeikan University, Keio University, Meiji University, Sophia 
University, Doshisha University) are excluded from the table. It is important to note 
that Times Higher Education constantly increases the number of universities in 
their world rankings and the rankings underwent a change in methodology in 2011, 
so it is possible that there are many different factors that have affected the world 
rankings.
According to the data reported in Table 3 it is clear to see that every single 
university that participated in the G30 program saw their international ranking fall 
by the end of the program. Some universities fell hundreds of places in the five 
years the G30 program existed. As well, few universities saw their composite 
scores for international students and outlook or citations increase. While this is due 
to a number of factors that were mentioned previously, it is clear that the ability of 
the G30 program to improve the global rankings of participant universities was an 
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abject failure.

























#148 30 23 #351-400 N/A N/A
University 
of Tokyo
#22 42 70 #23 29.6 69.8
Tsukuba 
University
#174 36 45 #301-350 32.6 48.9
Osaka 
University
#43 33 68 #157 27.6 50.4
Kyushu 
University
#155 34 63 #351-400 30.9 24.5
Kyoto 
University
#25 26 85 #59 27.5 58.2
Tohoku 
University
#97 32 57 #165 29.3 47.3
Nagoya 
University
#92 34 61 #226-250 55.1 28
As we have seen, the G30 program first failed to view internationalization as a way 
for higher education institutions to incorporate international groups and individuals 
into institutions, or to reform institutions along international norms or standards. 
Instead, the G30 program sought to improve the status of prestigious schools in 
Japan through focusing on metrics that would improve the global rankings of these 
schools, while significantly increasing the proportion of international students at 
these universities. Unfortunately, even for the stated goals of the G30 program, the 
vast majority of these agenda items failed to result in a positive impact.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
The G30 program was one that recognized the hegemony of English as Lingua 
Franca (ELF), especially in academia, and tried to improve Japan’s position within 
this paradigm. To say nothing of the colonial and imperial history that brought this 
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paradigm into being, ELF is a reflection of the globalized neoliberal economy, 
which has shaped educational systems around the world (Pennycook, 1998). There 
has long been a debate about the influence of globalization and internationalization 
and the various uses of these terms in Japanese higher education but generally these 
can be interpreted as the development of the Japanese economy internationally 
(Hashimoto, 2009; Yonezawa, 2010; 2011). It can be seen that the implicit goals of 
G30 can be viewed through this lens of internationalization as economic 
development and the explicit maintenance of Japanese national identity 
(Hashimoto, 2000). 
In a study conducted by Yonezawa, Akiba, and Hirouchi (2009), the presidents of 
many of Japan’s universities responded to a survey about their perception of 
internationalization within their institutions with over 75% of these university 
leaders perceiving internationalization as a way to develop Japan’s global economic 
competitiveness, and only a third perceiving it as a way to develop political, 
cultural, and academic alliances with foreign countries. Following this line of 
thought, internationalization as conceived by MEXT into educational and language 
policy is not a force of identity formation for students, but rather a tool for the 
promotion of Japanese economic power in the global economy (Le Ha, 2013; 
Yoshino, 1995). Furthermore, economic globalization is viewed in Japan as a form 
of adversity to be handled through the advocacy of the national image of Japan, 
reflected in their educational and language policy (Burgess, Gibson, Klaphake & 
Selzer, 2010; Hashimoto, 2009; 2013b; Lincicome, 2005). This is evident in the 
definition of internationalization in educational and language policy through not 
focusing on the development of international students’ agency in Japan or the 
development of an international outlook by Japanese students.
The G30 program was one that declared the intention to internationalize Japanese 
higher education, and was funded with 15 billion yen. However, the way in which 
internationalization was interpreted had a profound effect on how educational and 
language policy embedded in such a program was conceived of and implemented. 
Following the paradigm of education as human capital investment in the globalized 
neoliberal economy, MEXT formulated G30 in order to improve the international 
standings of elite Japanese universities, improving the economic and other ‘soft’ 
powers of the nation. Developing the international outlook of Japanese students, 
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overhauling Japanese universities’ procedures to fall more in line with international 
standards, or increasing the ability of Japanese students to use English for 
communication; these are all areas that were possible through alternative 
internationalization programs, but would be antithetical to the action plans that 
were formulated by MEXT and enacted at most participating institutions. 
Therefore, MEXT, and the Japanese government at large, do not conceive of 
English as a language of social use or expression, but rather of economic 
development. As well, education is not viewed as a process of the development of 
individual identity formation, but rather that of national identification and human 
capital investment towards national economic development.
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Abstract
The Global 30 (G30) program was tasked with aiding in increasing the 
number  o f  in ternat iona l  s tudents  and to  promote the overa l l 
internationalization of higher education in Japan. However, upon its 
conception, continuing through its implementation, and eventually to its 
premature cancellation, the G30 program proved to be more failure than 
success. This paper discusses how the G30 program failed in its aims, both 
in explicit increases in international students as well as implicit improvement 
in the international outlook of higher education institutions in Japan.
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